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Introduction 
Comes Now, the Appellant, Pro Se, and respectfully submits this PETITION FOR 
REHEARING pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in an effort 
to bring points of law and facts to the attention of this court that have been overlooked 
and or misapprehended in the opinion released on January 17, 2008. The Utah Court of 
Appeals has continuing jurisdiction in the matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 (2)(h) Utah 
Code Ann., as amended. The Appellant certifies that this petition is presented in good 
faith and not to delay. 
The opinion released, January 17, 2008, neglects many of the facts and several 
issues brought forth in the brief of the Appellant. A denial of this motion for rehearing 
would be a continuation of the misapplication of law, abuse of discretion on behalf of the 
District Court, and disregard for the facts in this case. 
Argument 
The Appellant filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in April of 2005 
alleging a substantial and material change in circumstances with two primary grounds 
that: 1) the Respondent earns significantly more money than she did at the time of the 
mediated "Memorandum of Understanding" and 2) that the Petitioner earns significantly 
less money than he did at the time of the mediated "Memorandum of Understanding". 
The Appellant filed an appeal before this court challenging the lower court 
findings as they do not address the material issues brought forth in the petition to modify 
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the decree of divorce. The district court's ruling states that the Petitioner has failed to 
meet his burden of proof on all issues and that there are no merit to his claims. However, 
the question before the lower court was "were the changes in the parties income at such a 
level to meet the statutory threshold requirements in a substantial material change in 
circumstance?". 
The question brought before the higher court was "Whether the Appellant 
provided the information required by statute necessary in establishing the threshold of a 
substantial material change in circumstances has occurred and that the change was not 
contemplated at the time the decree was enter or at the time of the 2003 mediation? If so, 
did the trial court abuse its discretion in not following the requirements of law?". 
The trial court has an obligation of law as stated in U.C.A. 78-45-7.2 to determine 
whether [or not] a substantial material change is circumstances has occurred. The 
threshold to establish a substantial and material change in circumstances addressing this 
allegation is material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent as stated within 
U.C.A. 78-45-7.2 (9)(b)(iii). U.C.A. 78-45-7.2 (9)(c) provides direction to the Court that 
"Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), which gives a parent the right to 
petition the court to adjust the amount of child support if there has been a substantial 
change in circumstances, the court shall, taking into account the best interests of the 
child, determine whether a substantial change in circumstance has occurred. 
In addressing the first primary material issue brought forth in the Petitioner's 
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Petition, the district court found that the gross income of the petitioner's was $8,000.00 
per month in 2005 by averaging the $14,500.00 the petitioner made in the first three 
months of 2005 and the $5,833.33 that the petitioner earned in the last nine months of 
2005. The averaged amount of $8,000.00 is a 45% decrease in the petitioner's income 
from the original amount in the child support calculation of $16,700.00. This decrease in 
gross income led the district court to find that the petitioner is 'Voluntarily 
underemployed" even though the petitioner remains at the same company in the same job 
he has held for the prior nine years. In additional to the decrease in pay, the district court 
supported its finding of'Voluntarily underemployed" with the past earnings of the 
petitioner and the fact that the petitioner attends school. 
The finding of 'Voluntarily underemployed" would suggest that the district court 
found that the petitioner's gross income had in fact changed. The lower court stated that 
the petitioner's adjusted gross income of $3,500.00 per month listed on the new child 
support calculation after the subtraction of business related expenses and an additional 
child in the petitioner's home as detailed by statute was not credible. 
How is it possible that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof on all 
issues and have no merit to his claims in seeking a substantial material change in 
circumstances, when the trial court uses all the above income information to support its 
finding of "voluntary underemployment"? The district court does in fact have a statutory 
basis on which to determine an imputed income but failed to use it in this case. While the 
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district court used past earnings to establish earning capacity, there is no evidence 
suggesting that the petitioner could maintain the same gross income in future probable 
earnings nor was evidence admitted in regards to the incomes of individuals with similar 
training and backgrounds or data from the Department of Workforce Services (U.C.A. 
78-45-7.5). Therefore there is no basis for the district court to determine whether the 
income from the past was an underemployment or over-employment situation. 
The second argument in the Petition for Rehearing addresses '"whether the court 
erred in its finding that the Appellee has not misrepresented her income at the time of the 
mediation and enforced agreement of 2003?". There is no challenge before the higher 
court that the district court found that the respondent had not misrepresented her income. 
The challenge before the higher court is that the district court's finding was that the 
respondent had not misrepresented her income when the material issue brought before the 
district court was "whether [or not] the respondent's income had increased by the 30% or 
more required to achieve the threshold for a substantial material change in 
circumstance?". The district court erred by making a finding that which was not before 
the court and failed to make any findings regarding the material issue that was brought 
before it by petition. 
The Court of Appeals should rehear this challenge to the district court's findings, 
reverse the finding that the respondent has not misrepresented her income, and remand 
the issue to the district court to enter findings about the adjusted gross income of the 
-4-
respondent and its effect upon the possible substantial and material change in 
circumstances to determine whether the statutory threshold has been met. 
In seeking a modification based on a substantial and material change in 
circumstances, the Appellant would have to achieve the threshold of material changes of 
30% or more in the income of a parent which in accordance with the petition filed in 
April of 2005, could be either parent but need not be both parents. 
The Appellee's adjusted gross monthly income in the calculation of the 2003 child 
support amount was $2,000.00. The Appellee had an adjusted gross monthly income of 
over $6,900.00 in 2004 which is an increase of 345%. The Appellee had an adjusted gross 
monthly income of over $6,100 in 2005 which is an increase of 305%. This evidence 
presented in Petitioner's Exhibit #19 using the Appellee's tax returns exceeds the required 
threshold by ten times of the second primary issue of the petition filed by the district 
court. The trial court must make findings on all material issues; failure to do so 
constitutes reversible error. Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476,478 (Utah App. 1988). 
The trial court failed to make any findings regarding this material issue as brought forth 
in the Appellant's Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. 
Standards of Review 
The Court of Appeals, through its opinion of this matter incorrectly applies the 
standard of review stating "We review the district court's "'[factual] findings for clear 
error and its conclusions of law for correctness, affording the court some discretion in 
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applying the law to the facts.9'9 Olsen v. Olsen. 2007 UT App 296, 7, 169 P.3d 765 
(quoting E.B. v. State, 2002 UT App 270, 11, 53 P.3d 963). This standard of review 
does not apply. In E.B. v. State, 53 P.3d 963 Utah App., 2002, it states that: "In 
termination of parental rights cases, appellate court reviews the juvenile court's findings 
for clear error and its conclusions of law for correctness, affording the court some 
discretion in applying the law to the facts. This case does not involve the termination of 
parental rights nor does is it before the juvenile court. Therefore it would be inappropriate 
to apply this standard to this case as it would make the district court's discretion overly 
broad. 
The Court of Appeals also stated in paragraph 7 that: "the district court also noted 
that any actual decrease in petitioner's income resulted for his voluntary return to school, 
a circumstance that will not ordinarily justify a reduction in child support. See Hill v. Hill 
869 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (affirming imputation of income where parent 
left existing career to pursue further education. The application of the Hill case does not 
apply as the petitioner did not leave his existing career for the reason of education or any 
other reason. The petitioner has held the same job at the same company for nine years 
prior to the reduction in pay and an additional two years after the reduction in pay. 
The correct standards of Review are: 
1) The trial court must make findings on all material issues; failure to do so 
constitutes reversible error. Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476,478 (Utah App. 1988). 
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2) The Court of Appeals will not disturb the district court's actions in a child 
support proceeding unless the court exceeded the limits of its permitted discretion; 
however, it reviews the district court's decision for correctness to the extent it involves 
questions of statutory interpretation. Diener v. Diener, 98P.3d 1178 UT App., 2004). 
3) The trial court is required to follow statute and allow a modification if a 
party was able to demonstrate that a substantial material change in circumstances has 
accrued between the entry of the divorce decree and the filing of the modification 
petition. Diener v. Diener. 98P.3d 1178 UT App., 2004). 
4) The party seeking the modification of child support has the burden of 
showing a substantial change in circumstances; it is insufficient to show that there has 
been some change, without showing that such a change was substantial. Diener v. Diener. 
98P.3d 1178 UT App., 2004). 
5) The findings articulated by the trial court following a motion to modify 
child support should be more than cursory statements; they must be sufficiently detailed 
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion 
on each factual issue was reached. Diener v. Diener, 98P.3d 1178 UT App., 2004). 
6) The determination of the trial court that there [has or has not] been a 
substantial change in circumstances... is presumed valid, " and we review the ruling under 
the abuse of discretion standard." Woodward v. Woodward. 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 
1985). 
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Issue of Integrity 
The Court of Appeals states in its published opinion within paragraph 3 that the 
Appellant/petitioner has been found in contempt of court. This statement is not true as the 
Appellant has never been held in contempt of court in any court for any reason. This 
statement is a reflection of the Appellant's character and should be removed. Whether or 
not this court grants the rehearing of this issue, the Appellant requests that the published 
opinion of this court be amended to correct this error. 
Conclusion 
The petitioner entered evidence at trial in Utah's Second District Court of the past 
and current incomes of both parties as the primary material issues in seeking a 
determination of a substantial material change in circumstances. Child support was 
calculated in 2003 with the income of the respondent at $2,000.00 per month and 
$16,700.00. In April, 2005 the petitioner filed a modification petition due to a reduction 
in pay. The petitioner's new monthly pay rate was $5,833.33 or $70,000.00 per year. In 
the calculation of the adjusted gross income by subtracting business expenses and an 
amount for a child in the petitioner's home, the adjusted gross income was $3,500.00. 
In discovery, the respondent's tax returns showed an increase in income of over 300% in 
2004 and 2005. 
The material issues in this case are whether a substantial material change in 
circumstances has occurred. The basis supporting this change through the modification 
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petition was a decrease in the petitioner's income and an increase in the respondent's 
income. Both of these material issues were shown at trial through admitted evidence to 
easily meet the statutory threshold for a substantial and material change in circumstances. 
The district court entered a number of findings but none were made toward the 
three distinct questions put before the court. The trial court must make findings on all 
material issues; failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Andersen v. Andersen, 757 
P.2d 476, 478 (Utah App. 1988). 
Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Utah State Court of Appeals should grant 
the Appellant's Petition to rehear this challenge to the district court findings and 
respectfully prays for relief as follows: 
1. Reverse the district court's finding that the Petitioner has failed to meet his 
burden of proof on all issues. 
2. Remand the issue of whether [or not] a substantial and material change in 
circumstances has occurred due to a material change in the income of 30% or more of 
either parent. 
3. Reverse the district court's finding that the Respondent had not 
misrepresented her income and remand this issue to the district court to enter the 
necessary findings of whether [or not] the Respondent's income has changed to the point 
meeting the threshold of a substantial and material change of circumstances according to 
statute. 
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4. Reverse the district court's finding that the Petitioner in voluntarily 
underemployed and remand this issue to the district court for further proceeding at which 
time the finding may be reentered with adequate supporting findings. 
5. A release of an opinion from the Court of Appeals that is free from 
incorrect statements about the Appellant ever being found in contempt of court. 
* < - * Dated this ^ * day of February, 2008. 
b. U^(/^/^ 
Alan D. Arnold, Petitioner 
Served upon: 
C. Richard Henriksen 
Henriksen & Henriksen 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing was hand 
delivered to the above address of C. Richard Henriksen, attorney for the 
respondent/Appellee on the day of February, 2008. 
i <*^c O ' ^^e^c/^' 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
M«M»WM 
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Alan D. Arnold 
Petitioner 
5378 South 1345 West 
Riverdale, Utah 84405 
Telephone: (801)627-4343 
Facsimile: (801)627-4344 
Cellular: (801)721-4255 
^ -i * »\D JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE Of U1A1-1 
ALAN D. ARNOLD, 
k/ ik/ \ H -.RNOI I j 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
PETITION TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No, 984901956 
Judge Baldwin 
X 
< 
a < 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, respectfully submits tn• renin - Mn i % * i -e 
:. .'Cvjuu . - • *"ic: •' into on Decembers, 1998, in the Second Judicial District 
Court of Weber County, State of Utah which wa., ;/i^.;;isci: U::^UL.; - - • i 
o. -.-n-jei-Uii-u.. ,-!*>- . : J September 22, 2003. The Petitioner alleges that since 
g the date of the Modification through the "Memorandum of Understanding"; their > i 
S o 
O -J 
«N O 
m £~ 
been substcintKii maki i;il eh;uige in the circumstances of the parties, necessitating the 
modification of the Decree of Divorce as set* forth below. 1 be Petitioner alleges as 
follows: 
1 -TI-UA. r^ rfir*q-vvp.re initiallv granted a Decree ui i .H\<MXI" un m nbdui 
ceived : 4/26/05 4:46PM:
 ftni Q Q i r „-,^ 
8 0 1 9 8 5
 «
7 3 3
 "> Henrxksen & HenriKsen, P.c- Paae 2 
=lpr 2 6 05 0 4 : 4 3 p flxic 
P 1 C
 8 0 1 - - W 7 3 3
 p . 2 
December 3? 1998. by the Second Judicial Districi Court of Weber County, State of 
Utah. (Sec Decree of Divorce, attached hereto as Exhibit UA?') 
2 The parlies participated in a mediation session where a "Memorandum 
of Understanding25 was agreed to and signed. (See "Memorandum of Understanding", 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B") 
3. Subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce and Modification using 
the "Memorandum of Understanding", the circumstances of the parties have changed in 
a substantia] and material way, as follows: 
a. The Respondent earns significantly more money than she claimed 
at the time of the mediated "Memorandum of Understanding''. 
b. The Petitioner earns significantly less money than was reported at 
the time of the mediated "Memorandum of Understanding". 
c. The Petitioner has shouldered the major portion of the care for the 
minor child according to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
4, The above listed facts constitute a material change in the circumstances of 
the parties, which changes necessitate a modification of the Order, as follows: 
a. That the child support should now be modified based upon the 
parties incomes and statutory guidelines set forth in the Uniform 
Child Support Guidelines for the minor child. This support should 
be effective from that time of service of this petition so long as the 
reported incomes were correct at the time of mediation on 
September 22, 2003. 
b. That the Petitioner be awarded the annual tax deduction for the 
j c e i v e d : 4 / 2 6 / 0 5 4 : 4 6 M M * 
8 0 1 9 8 5 4 7 3 3 - > H e n n k s e n & H e n r i k s e n , P„C • P a n e 3 
Bpr 2 6 05 U 4 : 4 3 p fVx i c " 
8 0 1 - T ' ^ - 4 7 3 3 p . 3 
parties minor child from the year 2005 forward. 
c. That the agreement to pay out; h;j!i a! ihr Million and fees for the 
Christian Heritage School be removed from mandatory status. 
d. That both the Respondent and . . • •• • , ..• dental, 
vision, and orthodontic insurance for the minor child so long as it 
is available at a reasonable ?- H -^- • "•••bie at a 
reasonable price, the party not carrying the required insurance 
reimburse the carrying party lo: ; : :\- cnildJs 
•. ^.kct portion of the insurance premiums. 
e. That the Summertime overnighls/School. Break time overnights/ 
• * iay break time over nights be split evenly to create 
Parent Time over nights jr. pia^c o- ^U-LK^ - : • ••• r 
P'm »nt T I T in 
5. All other provisions of the Decree oi JJIVOICL ana ;..•< / f 
''Memorandum ul I inderMandni}' not specifically modified herein, shall remain 
unchanged. 
Vv t J H , r »•• 'i • • i the foregoing, the Petitioner respectfully prays for 
the relief as follows: 
1. Voi
 tt • - . . , . • . ' • • ::;" provisions of the Decree of Divorce and 
"Memorandum of Understanding", based of the terms ana continu.*. - ! •• : > ; v e . 
2. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitabie 
in the premises. 
!
"
1 V e d : 4 / 8 B / 0 6
 « = ^ PM; 8 0 1 8 8 5 4 7 3 a . > H . n r m . n 4 H . „ n . C . ; Page 4 
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-, .n y? / 
Dated this ^ ^ ' day of j f v f f j ^ , 2005. 
/ x " • y , ' 
Alan Arnold 
Petitioner 
Petitioners Address: 
5378 S. 1345W. 
Riverdalc, Utah 84405 
